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Introduction
Environmental taxes are used to quite a large
extent in European countries. OECD data show
that these taxes represent around 3 percent of
GDP on average (OECD 2003).The coverage and
levels of environmental taxes is highly variable
between countries. For example, Sweden, Norway
and Denmark charge a tax on sulphur emissions
(measured as sulphur dioxide, SO2) which is
approximately EUR 1300/tonne in Denmark and
EUR 1600/tonne in Sweden, whereas SO2 taxes in
Italy, France, Switzerland and Spain, for instance,
are all less than EUR 50/tonne (Sterner 2002).
Most often, though, such taxes are used as comple-
ments to existing command-and-control regulation
by emission standards. In order to overcome polit-
ical resistance to environmental taxes, some coun-
tries adopted a system of earmarking under which
the revenues of the charge are returned to the
aggregate population of taxed firms.
In Sweden, the charge on NOx emissions from
industrial boilers is automatically and fully refund-
ed to the industries that paid the tax on the basis of
their energy use (Sterner and Höglund 2000). This
has led to a large number of abatement invest-
ments, fuel switching and other measures that
reduced emission coefficients by about 50 percent
within just 5 years for the 190 large plants that
were first targeted.These plants now have very low
emissions by international standards. The French
air pollution tax from 1985–1999 constitutes anoth-
er example of such an earmarked environmental
tax, of which the revenues were used to subsidize
pollution-reducing investments (abatement) at
tax-paying emission sources.
Here we present recent empirical evidence on the
ex post efficiency of this environmental tax. The
French tax on air pollution partly resembles the
Swedish NOx charge in that revenues were rebat-
ed back to industry, although in a more indirect
manner (the firms have to apply for subsidies for
specific abatement investments). Also, in Sweden,
the tax rates for SO2 and NOx emissions are almost
100 times higher than the French tax rates.
Notwithstanding, the analysis is of some interest
since we use unique panel data on plant character-
istics in order to assess the ex post effect of the
combined tax and subsidy.
The French tax on air pollution
The French tax on air pollution (“taxe parafiscale
sur la pollution atmosphérique”, la TPPA) that we
evaluate here was introduced initially in 1985 for
SO2 emissions, and subsequently extended in 1990
to encompass NOx1 and hydrochloric acid (HCl)
and then in 1995 also emissions of volatile organic
compounds (VOC)2. From 1990 onwards, the tax
was imposed on any entity that fulfilled either of
two criteria: a maximum combustion capacity
equal to or exceeding 20 MW or annual emissions
of more than 150 tonnes of either SO2,NO x,HCl or
VOC. Household waste incineration plants with a
capacity exceeding 3 tonnes an hour were also sub-
ject to the tax. In 1990, the tax targeting SO2,N O x,
and HCl emissions was set at a rate of approxi-
mately EUR 23/tonne. It was increased in 1995 to
EUR 28/tonne, and again in 1998 to EUR 38/tonne
for NOx and VOC only. If the total tax due was less
than EUR 153 for a unit, no tax was levied. This
made for a total of tax-paying sources ranging from
1200 in 1990 to nearly 1500 in 1999.The system tar-
geted air pollution from fixed sources only and did
not comprise emissions from the transport sector.
The tax was administered by the French Agency
for Environment and Energy Management
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(ADEME)3 which received 6 percent of the tax
revenues towards its administration costs. The sys-
tem was based on self-reporting of emissions from
the previous year, and ADEME reports a high
level of enforcement: over 90 percent of taxes due
were actually paid.The revenues from the tax were
earmarked for subsidies to abatement investments
or for research and development, corresponding to
75 percent of total tax revenues.Any plant subject
to the TPPA could apply for a subsidy, which was
awarded according to percentage rates of the addi-
tional fixed capital investment for emission reduc-
tions: 15 percent for standard abatement technolo-
gies, and 30 percent for particularly innovative
technologies. There was also an additional 10 per-
cent subsidy for small and medium-sized compa-
nies.A study of ADEME data shows that almost all
applications were funded, and in this sense, there
was to a certain extent an automatic refunding of
the tax revenues to the aggregate population of
companies. The distributional impact, however,
depended on whether a plant took the initiative to
ask for an abatement subsidy.
In the year 2000, the TPPA was replaced by a gen-
eral pollution tax4 levied by the customs authori-
ties and no longer administered by ADEME,which
nevertheless continues to handle requests for
abatement subsidies paid out of the general gov-
ernment budget. Our analysis encompasses the
period when the TPPA was an integrated ear-
marked tax system.
Applied analysis
The empirical analysis (Millock and Nauges 2003b)
aims to explain the level of emissions by a plant,
controlling for the tax rate, the characteristics of
the plant in terms of its production process (maxi-
mum combustion capacity and energy consump-
tion) and financial information available at the
firm level (value added, self-financing capacity).
We also control for technological change or equiv-
alently for subsidies requested from ADEME by a
plant willing to invest in an abatement technology.
The choice of the plant to benefit from the system
of subsidies, which may be endogenous in the
model,is described as a function of the tax rate and
firm level data, namely, the number of employees,
self-financing capacity and value added.We do not
observe any penalty in case of non-compliance but
we use the average number of measurement points
with at least one exceedance of an hour of the air
quality standards as a proxy for the compliance
level in the region where the plant is located.
Information regarding emissions, taxes, and subsi-
dies were collected at ADEME for each plant sub-
ject to taxation according to French air pollution
regulation over the period 1990-98. A search for
plant ID numbers allowed us to match the existing
plant-level emission data with firm-level data from
the annual business survey made by the French
Ministry of Industry.Finally,in order to include the
effect of differences in compliance and enforce-
ment of technology based standards, we have
added data from IFEN, the French National
Institute of the Environment, on exceedance of air
quality standards.
The analysis focuses on three pollutants (SO2,
NOx,VOC) and five industrial sectors (plastic and
rubber, cars, iron and steel, coke, and chemistry).
These sectors were chosen because of their large
contribution to overall pollution and because of
their high rate of subsidy requests for pollu-
tion abatement. The sector of plastic and rubber,
and the car industry are VOC emitters, where-
as the other three sectors primarily emit SO2
and NOx.
The main objective of the study was to evaluate the
abatement elasticity with regard to the tax and the
subsidy. Separate estimations were made for each
of the five sectors. In general, the tax had a signifi-
cant negative impact on VOC and SO2 emissions,
but not on NOx emissions (for which abatement is
technically more difficult).All else equal, the high-
er the tax rate, the higher the probability that the
firm applied for an abatement subsidy.The effect of
the subsidy, however, generally seemed to have
increased emissions significantly and to an extent
that dwarfed the negative impact of the tax. Finally,
the impact of business data is often found signifi-
cant but varies by sector. We describe below in
more detail the impact of each group of variables.
Tax and subsidy
Table 1 sums up the main results regarding the
impact of the tax and the subsidy on emissions by
sector.
3 Agence de l’Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l’Energie.
4 La Taxe Générale sur les Activités Polluantes (TGAP).As far as VOC emissions are concerned, the tax
had a negative effect on emissions but it is signifi-
cant only for plants belonging to the sector of plas-
tic and rubber.As there is no inter-firm variation in
the tax rate, we may capture a general trend in
addition to the direct effect of the tax.The data do
not allow us to distinguish, e.g., a sharpening of
technology standards.We thus have to caution that
the results should be interpreted as an upper
bound on the tax response.
Except for the model of the chemistry sector, the
NOx tax is not significant in any of the models even
if it has the expected negative sign. We attribute
this to the TPPA regulation’s statutes for monitor-
ing. Under the TPPA regulation, firms could
choose between using direct emissions monitoring
or using standardised emission factors to estimate
emissions from fuel consumption data. For SO2
emissions, the use of emission factors may proxy
real emissions quite well. For NOx emissions, on
the contrary, accurate real emissions monitoring
would have been more important since emissions
vary strongly with fine-tuning of plant operations.
The incentive effect of the tax thus seems to have
been larger for SO2 emissions than for NOx emis-
sions (as can be seen from Table 1), since an esti-
mation of NOx emissions gives weaker incentives
for abatement investments. It is only in the sector
of coke, which is an industry in decline, that the
SO2 tax had no significant impact on emissions.
Furthermore, we find that a higher tax rate did
increase the probability to apply for a subsidy and
to install new abatement equipment in the sectors
of plastic and rubber, iron and steel, coke, and
chemistry.
The effect of the rebating in the form of a subsidy
towards abatement technology differs according to
sector but in general the abatement subsidy
appeared to have had a positive impact on emis-
sions (except for the iron and steel industry). The
most likely explanation of this result is a kind of
output or “rebound” effect. The installation of an
end-of-pipe abatement technology can have a
rebound effect similar to what has been observed
for energy efficiency improvements. Even if emis-
sion coefficients are reduced (as they are almost
bound to be by a specific abatement subsidy) there
may well have been increases in production that
were sufficiently large to reverse this effect on
absolute emission levels. Unfortunately, we did not
have data on individual production that allowed us
to quantify this effect.
Regulatory pressure
As concerns regulatory pressure, plants located in
regions with a larger exceedance of air quality SO2
standards invest more in abatement technology, all
other things equal. Surprisingly, the opposite effect
was found in the case of NOx.
Business data
In general, large plants (measured as those with a
high number of employees) were more likely to
invest in a new abatement technology.Larger firms
can be assumed to have better information about
available subsidies and financing possibilities. The
impact of self-financing capacity and value added
on the investment decision vary by sector. Plants
with a higher self-financing capacity and a lower
valued added are more likely to invest in a new
abatement technology in the sectors of iron and
steel, and chemistry. In the coke sector, the oppo-
site holds.
The Swedish Refunded Emission Payment on NOx
There are several reasons behind Sweden’s deci-
sion to refund emission taxes for NOx. A crucial
problem in this context is that a tax on all point
CESifo DICE Report 1/2004 32
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Table 1
Impact of the tax and the subsidy on emissions by sector
Plastic & rubber Car industry Iron & steel Coke Chemistry
Tax Subs. Tax Subs. Tax Subs. Tax Subs. Tax Subs.
VOC em. – + ns + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
NOx em. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. ns _ ns + _ ns
SO2 em. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. _ ns ns + _ +
Note: “ns” means that the tax/subsidy has a non-significant (at the 10% level of confidence) impact on emissions.CESifo DICE Report 1/2004 33
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sources of airborne NOx emissions was impossible
since monitoring was too expensive for small units.
NOx emissions are not like sulphur emissions
which can easily be calculated based on the sulphur
content of the fuel. NOx emissions are largely due
to the chemical reaction in the combustion cham-
ber between nitrogen and oxygen from the air.The
extent and speed of this reaction is highly nonlin-
ear in temperature and other combustion parame-
ters. This has two implications: Firstly it implies
that there is a large scope for NOx reduction
through various technical measures. The environ-
mental charge should therefore stimulate innova-
tion in abatement technology. Secondly, physical
measurements and monitoring are absolutely nec-
essary. Experience from the Swedish program has
shown that it is not just the abatement equipment
but the fine-tuning of operation that leads to NOx
reduction. Actual monitoring is required both for
outside inspectors and, indeed, for plant engineers
to know emissions levels and therefore which mea-
sures are successful. If small units were to be
excluded because of high measurement costs, a
high tax levied only on large units would encour-
age the operation of small, and less efficient units.
The politically feasible solution,which still allowed
for a high charge level, was to impose the fee only
on the large combustion furnaces but refund it to
the same group of firms.
The fee (of SEK 40 per kg which is at current rates
above 4,000 EUR/ton) initially applied to all boil-
ers producing at least 50 GWh of energy per year.
Roughly 200 plants were affected including not
only the energy sector but also pulp and paper
mills, food, metal and other manufacturing as well
as waste incineration plants. In 1996 and 1997, the
limits for eligibility were lowered to 40 and 25
GWh/year, respectively, bringing in about 170 new
units into the scheme. The Swedish EPA manages
the scheme at a small administrative cost amount-
ing to 0.2–0.3 percent of revenues. The entire,
remaining, revenue of about 600 million SEK
(about p 70 million) per year is refunded. Table 2
shows that the refunded emission payment has
indeed had some quite significant effects in reduc-
ing emission coefficients.
Conclusion
The results indicate that the overall effectiveness
of a revenue rebating scheme where the rebate is
tied to abatement subsidies like the French air pol-
lution tax system during the 1990s can be ques-
tioned. In general, the tax had a significant nega-
tive impact on SO2 and VOC emissions, but not on
NOx emissions. We attribute this difference in the
impact to the French regulation’s monitoring pro-
cedures for emissions. The lack of real emissions
monitoring severed the link between the tax base
and actual emissions and diluted the incentive
effect of the tax for this particular pollutant. All
else equal, the higher the tax rate, the higher the
probability that the firm applied for an abatement
subsidy. The combined subsidy, however, generally
increased emissions significantly and to an extent
that dwarfed the negative impact of the tax.
Nevertheless, our results vary by sector and show
the importance of a disaggregated analysis.
In addition to these results, we furthermore find
that the combined tax/subsidy biased the technolo-
gy adoption decision towards investing in end-of-
pipe measures rather than clean technology in the
sense of a reorganization of production, input use,
etc. In fact, the proportion of end-of-pipe invest-
ments in our sample varies from 62 percent in the
sector of plastic and rubber to
almost 90 percent for SO2 and
NOx emissions in the chemistry
sector (ADEME). Part of the
difference in the proportion of
end-of-pipe investments bet-
ween sectors is due to the fact
that substitution and recycling
of inputs may be more feasible
for VOC emissions than for
NOx and SO2 emissions. Ne-
vertheless, the high prevalence
of end-of-pipe investments is
also due to the rules for grant-
Table 2
The development of emission coefficients
in the Swedish NOx scheme
– kg NOx /MWh produced energy –
1992 1995 1997 1999 2000
Min 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06
Max 0.99 0.78 1.04 0.88 0.90
Median 190 0.39 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.19
Average 0.41 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.25
Note: Minimum (maximum) emission coefficients are average for the
10 best (worst) plants. Median 190 is the median coefficient for the
190 firms that were included throughout the period. The “average” also
includes plants that were included as the scheme was enlarged to cover
more (and smaller) units.ing a subsidy. Since subsidies were set as fixed per-
centages of the capital investment cost, this biased
the incentives towards capital-intensive end-of-
pipe measures.
So what policy advice might be given to improve
upon the functioning of environmental taxes on air
pollution, in particular? By comparison with
Scandinavian environmental taxes, the French tax
on air pollution was set at a relatively low level. It
is likely that this level was too low to warrant most
of the relevant and effective abatement technolo-
gies.This is a fundamental problem when it comes
to NOx emissions where abatement is fairly costly
and the tax level thus needs to be very high in
order to provide a real incentive for firms to abate.
It implies that the political economy of the instru-
ment chosen is very important. It appears that the
automatic and full rebating of the Swedish tax
made it politically easier to set a sufficiently high
tax level and this may be a vital advantage of that
form of rebating.
We would argue, however, that there are other
fundamental institutional features of the tax that
need to be addressed in order to improve the
incentives effect of the tax. In the first place, mon-
itoring of real emissions is a vital prerequisite to
keep the link between the tax base and emissions,
in particular for emissions of NOx. It is instructive,
in this regard, to compare the French tax on NOx
with the Swedish revenue-recycled charge on NOx
from industrial sources (Millock and Sterner
2004). The refunding of the revenue of the
Swedish NOx charge was motivated in part by the
requirement to install costly monitoring equip-
ment. The experience with the Swedish NOx
charge showed that it is not simply the installation
of abatement equipment that matters but its fine-
tuning and continued adjustment to the produc-
tion process, in particular for NOx emissions,
where emissions depend not only on the fuel input
but also on process factors such as the tempera-
ture and oxygen content of the combustion cham-
ber. Precise monitoring equipment encourages the
firm to continually minimize emissions. In the
absence of real time monitoring, even the plant
engineers themselves will not know which controls
increase or decrease NOx emissions, and they will
thus be unable to fine tune them.
The other important design feature concerns the
mechanism by which the tax revenues are refund-
ed to the tax-payers. Under the French regulation,
tax revenues were used to subsidize abatement
investments and the selection of projects was made
following an administrative procedure. Such a rule
has at least three drawbacks. First, firms may
receive subsidies for investments that they would
have undertaken anyway. Second, there is no built-
in check on the ex post efficiency or proper use of
subsidized abatement equipment. By comparison,
the revenues from the Swedish NOx charge were
refunded in relation to the amount of energy pro-
duced by the specific plant. An automatic refund-
ing rule like that of the Swedish NOx charge pro-
vides continuous incentives to firms to reduce
emissions and become more efficient in terms of
emissions per energy unit. Such a refunding rule
can be envisaged in the case of emissions deriving
from energy use, since a common measurement
unit (energy) exists across different industrial sec-
tors. It would be difficult for emissions such as
VOC that derive from different kinds of solvents,
however. Third, the calculation of subsidies as a
percentage of capital costs seems likely to have
created a bias towards end-of-pipe measures rather
than towards production processes that recycles or
substitutes polluting inputs.
In conclusion, refunded environmental taxes have
a real potential to reduce emissions in an efficient
manner, but as with all instruments, the institution-
al design of the tax system is crucial.
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